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"IMPOR TANT SERVICE" IN MILITARY LAW
ALFRED AVINS t
The Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes punishment by
court-martial of any member of the armed forces who absents himself
without authority from his place of duty.' Although AWOL can be
a serious infraction,2 it is relatively minor when viewed in the light
of the possible consequences of desertion--death during wartime,3 dis-
honorable discharge and up to five years' imprisonment during peace-
time.4 Ordinarily, one thinks of desertion as abandoning one's place
of duty "with intent to remain away therefrom permanently," and it
is so defined in article 85 (a) (1) of the Code.' But article 85 (a) (2)-
the "short desertion" statute-punishes as a deserter anyone who quits
his unit or place of duty with intent to shirk "important service," re-
gardless of whether he intends to stay away permanently or how long
he is actually absent.6 Military courts have recognized the gravity of
this offense; indeed, the only American serviceman executed during
World War II for a purely military offense was shot by a firing squad
for this crime.'
Although the Code does not define "important service," and
neither its prior derivation 8 nor the Manual for Courts-Martial 9 does
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- Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1958).
2 Maximum punishment, permissible only for the most extended absences, may
include dishonorable discharge and confinement at hard labor for up to one year.
Punishment for short AWOL's not under aggravating circumstances may not exceed
one month's confinement and forfeiture of pay. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES, 1951, 127(c), Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303, 1366
(1951), as amended, Exec. Order No. 10565, 19 Fed. Reg. 6299 (1954).
3 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 85(c), 10 U.S.C. § 885(c) (1958).
4
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, ff127(c), Exec. Order
No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303, 1366 (1951), as amended, Exec. Order No. 10565, 19
Fed. Reg. 6299 (1954).
510 U.S.C. §885(a) (1) (1958).
610 U.S.C. §885(a)(2) (1958). The same consequences attend anyone who
quits his unit or place of duty with intent to avoid "hazardous duty." See generally
note 10 infra.
7 S vik, 15 E.T.O. 151 (ETO No. 5555, 1945).
8 St e Avins, A History of Short Desertion, Military L. Rev., July, 1961, p. 143, at
163-64. The 1914 British Manual of Military Law branded as a deserter one who
went A WOL with the intention of "shirking some important service" and gave as
exampl, s evasion of embarkation for overseas duty and duty in aid of the civil power.
WAR C FFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 18-19 (1914). See also id. at 665 for a
speciwi n charge.
9 ee MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 164(a), Exec.
Ord 14o. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303, 1391 (1951).
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much to remedy this deficiency, the basic purpose for including the
important service provision in the short desertion statute seems clear:
certain duties assigned to servicemen are so vital to the mission of the
armed forces that their avoidance, even through a temporary absence,
must be prevented; the use of the extreme penalties incident to desertion
has been chosen as the means of deterrence.
Because the intent to avoid "important service" is the principal
difference between this offense and the less serious AWOL infraction,
the interpretation of these two words is crucial. This Comment will
discuss some of the standards by which the presence of important
service ought and ought not to be tested. In arriving at the proper
test for this concept, some standards in current use will first be exam-
ined. A clearer picture of what "important service' ought to mean
can be obtained from a view of the distortions to which the concept
has been and is currently being subjected.1"
I. COMBAT AND RELATED DUTIES
There is general agreement that the core of "important service"
is "actual service designed to protect or promote, in a manner direct
and immediate, the national or public interest or welfare . . . which
is the ultimate object of maintaining an army." " Preeminent among
10 Typical of the confusion surrounding the meaning of "important service" is
the Manual for Courts-Martial's failure to make any distinction between "important
service" and "hazardous duty." Ibid. It is axiomatic that service can be important
without being hazardous; few servicemen perform services of more importance than
the missile officer who must push "the button" in case of attack, yet this is-at least
in time of peace-one of the least hazardous of military duties. Similarly, important
strategic strokes, such as Admiral Dewey's decisive victory in the Battle of Manila
Bay (which successfully determined a major segment of the Spanish-American War),
may be rendered far from hazardous by the weakness of opposing forces. Yet the
military courts have been willingly misled by the language of the Manual. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cheney, 3 C.M.R. 173, 176 (1952) ("the accused could not have
shirked important service without at the same time avoiding hazardous duty"). It
is perhaps more plausible to suggest, as did the court in United States v. McIntyre,
2 U.S.C.M.A. 559, 562, 10 C.M.R. 57, 60 (1953), that "any duty which is hazardous
must of necessity be important" Why, one may ask, would a person be assigned a
hazardous duty unless it -was also important? Even when the hazard involved is
inherent in the duty, it is possible that bad judgment rather than the importance of
the task is the explanation of the hazardous assigmnent But when, as is commonly
the case, the hazard inheres in the place of duty rather than in the duty itself, the
question becomes meaningless. Kitchen police within range of enemy guns or enemy
planes may be extremely hazardous, yet is seems absurd to label this duty anything
more than "necessary,", and.important service implies, in view of the extreme punish-
ment for its avoidance, peculiarly vital tasks. Even the reasons for including the
avoidance of both hazardous duty and important service within the short desertion
statute seem to be different AWOL to avoid hazardous duty is severely punished
because a counterdeterrent is needed to balance natural reluctance to endanger oneself;
AWOL to avoid important service is severely punished because of the special need
that the duty be performed. Thus, "important service!' and "hazardous duty" can be
distinguished; the problems which are discussed in the remainder of this Comment
arise in part from the failure of the military courts to do so. See, e.g., text accom-
panying notes 27-28 and 46-48 infra.
11 CM 151672 (1922), DIG. O's. JAG op THE As.mty, 1912-40 § 385 (1942).
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these duties is the destruction or neutralization of or defense against
enemy military power. Hence it follows that combat with enemy
forces is always important service within the meaning of the statute.'
In addition to actual combat, work proximately in support of
combat operations is also important service. For example, it has been
held that a combat engineer company supporting combat units by clear-
ing and laying mines is engaged in important service."3 Likewise, an
armored engineer unit supporting two combat infantry commands by
repairing gaps made in the "dragon's teeth," constructing bridges, and
maintaining road blocks as defensive measures against enemy counter-
attacks is engaged in important service.' So too, it would appear
that artillery or antiaircraft units, medical aid personnel, and com-
munications and intelligence groups operating in support of combat
forces are all engaging in important service,' 5 for in each of these cases
the success of actual combat forces is immediately and directly de-
pendent upon the activities of individuals in these units.
For the same reason, transportation proximately in support of
combat units is important service. The transportation of fighting men
to the scene of battle to engage the enemy is indispensible; otherwise
the troops would not be where they are needed."8 Likewise, "carrying
supplies to equip and sustain the army is a very important military
operation in time of war." "
Beyond these obvious classifications, it becomes a matter of case-
by-case analysis to determine whether a duty is routine or important.
This is true whether or not the duty is to be performed in the combat
area; importance must be determined by weighing the consequences of
a failure to perform a duty, not by considering the place where it is to
be performed.'
12 E.g., Bragalone, 26 E.T.O. 207 (ETO No. 13253, 1945); Diedrickson, 24
E.T.O. 135 (ETO No. 11402, 1945). See also United States v. Anderson, 2 C.M.R.
238 (1951).
13 Pagano, 31 E.T.O. 127, 129 (ETO No. 16655, 1945).
14 Bartoloni, 13 E.T.O. 363 (ETO No. 4931, 1945).
15 Cf. Jennings, 17 E.T.O. 309 (ETO No. 6997, 1945). The court here-im-
properly, in my opinion-characterized the duty as "hazardous" rather than "impor-
tant."
16 McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80, 84-85 (E.D. Va. 1943).
17 EX parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415, 416 (D.N.J. 1918) ; see United States v. Shepard,
1 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 491, 4 C.M.R. 79, 83 (1952).
18 This point would not merit the attention which is here devoted to it were it
not for the existence of a considerable number of dicta to the contrary. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 186, 2 C.M.R. 92 (1952); United States v.
White, 2 C.M.R. 511, 514 (1952). In the former case, the court declared that "it is
likely that this Court would take judicial notice that all duty in a theater of opera-
tions, if not actually hazardous, would certainly involve important service." 1 U.S.
C.MA. at 188, 2 C.M.R. at 94.
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The better view may be seen in one of the earliest cases to consider
the effect of absence without leave in a combat theatre.' 9 The accused
went AWOL from his unit in New Guinea and stowed away in a
transport returning to the United States. He was charged with de-
sertion with intent to shirk important service as aid man in a rifle
company in a theatre of operations. Notwithstanding the fact that
the work of an aid man with troops actually engaged in combat is
incontestably important, the board of review held the evidence in-
sufficient to show that this accused was so engaged; it refused to find
important service in the combat zone assignment alone.20
This case was criticized in a subsequent decision in Washington
as "an extreme example . . . [whose authority] as a precedent is
open to some question." 2  In justification of this criticism, it may
be suggested that the accused was attempting to avoid service for the
remainder of the war, some of which would probably have included
service in close support of combat troops. Not only is this stretching
the relationship between the absence and the important service, but
even if this particular case was decided incorrectly on its facts, it illus-
trates the possibility of situations in which AWOL in a combat zone
does not entail the avoidance of important service.
A similar case arose in the European Theater of Operations in
April 1945.? The accused's unit was in Germany engaged in "mop-
ping-up operations" and the taking of German prisoners. The accused
had just returned from a period of AWOL and was restricted to the
rear area and told to work in and around the unit's kitchen until it
could be determined what was to be done with him. He informed his
first sergeant that "he did not see any reason for working as he was
going to get court-martialed anyway," 2 3 went AWOL again, and was
19 Evers, 1 A-P 437 (CM No. A-1142, 1944).
20 Although accused's organization was in a theater of operations when he
absented himself, there is no evidence that it was in proximity to the enemy
nor had it been alerted for movement to a forward area. There is no evi-
dence of the nature of the duties accused was then performing. Apparently,
such duties were only the routine duties of an aid man in a medical detach-
ment. . . . The mere absence of a soldier from his organization, even though
it is then within a theater of operations, in a foreign country, does not,
without other proof, establish prima facie that he intended to shirk important
service.
Id. at 439.
2 1 Hodge, 43 B.R. 41, 46 (CM No. 265447, 1944). The heart of the court's
criticism, however, lay in comparing Evers with Marquez, 16 B.R. 41 (CM No.
228022, 1943). Yet the Marquez case is clearly distinguishable, since in it the accused's
unit was located in Unalaska, Alaska, under Japanese attack at the time of his AWOL,
and, moreover, a specification that he avoided hazardous duty was joined to the
specification that he shirked important service.
2 2 Murtha, 28 E.T.O. 259 (ETO No. 14905, 1945).
23Id. at 262.
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convicted of desertion with intent to shirk important service. In re-
versing, the board held that "the record failed to disclose accused was
aware that any 'important service' as contemplated by Article of War
28, was expected of him." '
Here the accused's work was directly in support of a unit engaged
in combat operations. Nevertheless, it was held not to be "important"
within the meaning of the short desertion statute. While it cannot be
gainsaid that the work was necessary-combat troops must be fed
if they are to fight-, yet, because the accused's activities were not
shown to be absolutely necessary to feeding the unit, his assignment
was found not proximately vital to the success of the combat troops;
hence the tasks which he had deliberately foresaken were held not to
be "important" within the meaning of the statute.
In the light of these cases, the rule seems clearly to be that even
tasks in a combat area must be shown to be important before one who
shirks them can be punished as a deserter. Policy clearly supports
this rule: The object of the short desertion statute is to penalize more
harshly those who jeopardize military success by their AWOL and
hence to bind them to their tasks with a special deterrent. It is im-
material whether they are physically located in combat areas or outside
them; geographical location is equally immaterial if the absentee falls
outside the reason for the rule.'
II. TRANSPORTATION, EMBARKATION, AND OVERSEAS SERVICE
If the application of the short desertion statute's "important
service" provision to combat situations has resulted in few difficulties,
its application to transportation, embarkation, and overseas service
presents a picture of loose talk compounded with looser thinking re-
sulting in an all-encompassing confusion.
A. Is Transportation "Important" in Itself?
The initial answer to this question is that receiving transportation
is not of itself important service. A military person being transported
-24 Id. at 264. Cf. Shearer, 19 E.T.O. 17 (ETO No. 8104, 1945).
25 Otherwise, all absentees in combat zones would be ipso facto deserters, a result
which was hardly contemplated by the framers of the statute. Cf. Burns, 17 E.T.O.
195, 199 (ETO No. 6751, 1945). A recent British manual specifically requires that
the duty shirked be important, even if the accused is located in an area of active
military operations. 1 WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw 212 (1951):
The intention must be to avoid some important particular service, and
not merely some routine duty or duty only applicable to the accused. Even
on active service, a routine patrol not in the forward area or fire piquet duty
for which the accused was detailed would not amount to an important par-
ticular service, the intention of avoiding which would constitute desertion
under this section.
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not only does not render important service, he does not render any
service at all. If anything, the act of being transported is a service to
him rather than by him. This conclusion is supported by the cases
which deal with movement to an undisclosed destination. In such
cases, where only the fact of movement can be considered, the au-
thorities are uniform in holding that such movement does not consti-
tute important service 6
The question becomes more complex when the destination of the
avoided transportation is known. Here there are a number of factors
whose possible relevance must be considered: Is the shipment to an
overseas area or-perhaps more important-to a combat zone? Is the
duty to be performed upon the completion of transportation "important
service"? In avoiding transportation, is the avoider seeking to escape
the final duty to which he will be assigned after transportation, or is his
AWOL based on a distaste for travel or, even more typically, a general
distaste for military life?
The source of confusion in this entire area is a loosely drafted
enumeration in the Manual for Courts-Martial and a number of cases
which have blindly followed it. After confusing "hazardous duty" and
"important service" in a single section, the Manual tells us that these
terms (jointly or severally?) "may include . . . embarkation for
foreign duty . . .; movement to a port of embarkation for that
purpose; [or] entrainment for duty on the border or coast in time
of war." 27  Of course, any of the enumerated movements may
be hazardous; enemy submarines may be sinking our convoys, as they
were early in World War II, or enemy planes may be bombing our
railroads, as has fortunately not yet happened. But any justification
for the enumeration based on the hazardous nature of the trans-
portation fails to explain either the cases which describe transportation
as "important service" or the applicability of the short desertion statute
to servicemen who have avoided nonhazardous transportation.28
Nevertheless, the cases continue to misapply the statute. Thus
a board of review declared: "Embarkation for overseas was, of course,
important service." 29 Another stated: "Embarkation for foreign duty
2
6 E.g., Loss, 14 B.R. 307 (CM No. 225638, 1942) ; Townsend, 14 B.R. 277 (CM
No. 225505, 1942); Southern, 14 B.R. 229 (CM No. 225128, 1942). Missing any
troop movement "through neglect or design" is, however, an independent offense, less
harshly punished than desertion. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 87, 10 U.S.C.
§887 (1958).
2 7 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 164(a) (2), Exec.
Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303, 1391 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
2 8 This is the prime example of the difficulties caused by the haphazard inter-
mingling of "hazardous duty" and "important service" in the Manual. See note 10
u, 2 (7ra.
2 9Wicldund, 15 B.R. 299, 301 (CM No. 227459, 1942).
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is 'important service' within the meaning of the 28th Article." " And
still a third said: "Embarkation for foreign duty or duty beyond the
continental limits of the United States, or transfers or movements di-
rectly related to immediate embarkation for foreign duty has been
consistently recognized in the opinions of the Board of Review as
constituting 'important service' within the purview of Article of War
28." "' And there are many more cases where this rationale is not
specifically set forth but which implicitly assume the rule to be correct
and applicable.32
Moreover, the cases have read the words "may" out of the
Manual, converting a tentative enumeration into a rigid classification.
Thus all overseas voyages are now ipso facto important, although not
an iota of service is rendered on them and little of importance may be
done at the destination. Seldom has a rule of law been so stood on
its head.
B. The "Importance" of Foreign Duty
If the act of being transported should not of itself be considered
"important service," it is equally clear that not all foreign duty deserves
that label.3 3 Not only do the combat zone cases discussed above 4
illustrate this point, but the Court of Military Appeals has declared:
Undoubtedly, service beyond the continental limits of the
United States may, under certain circumstances, be consid-
ered "important service," but we believe that phrase as used
in the Article of War and as explained in the Manual denotes
something more than the ordinary everyday service of every
member of the armed forces stationed overseas. If it does
not, then absence without leave and desertion outside the con-
tinental limits of the United States would be synonymous.3 5
Moreover, in a case where domestic reassignment was in issue, it was
held that the importance of the service upon arrival at a destination is
not enhanced by the fact that a serviceman must travel to get there. 6
This result is consonant with both logic and experience, since routine
30 Green, 47 B.R. 191, 192 (CM No. 274478, 1945).
31 Parmelee, 41 B.R. 159, 165 (CM No. 262836, 1944). See also Moran, 34 B.R.
265, 267 (CM No. 253070, 1944).
32 See, e.g., Hodge, 43 B.R. 41 (CM No. 265477, 1944); Clancy, 29 B.R. 215
(CM No. 245568, 1943) ; Walkup, 19 B.R. 49 (CM No. 232342, 1943).
33 United States v. Hyatt, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 23 C.M.R. 291 (1957); United
States v. Barrett, 22 C.M.R. 550 (1956).
34See notes 19-24 spra and accompanying text.
35 United States v. Boone, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 381, 384, 3 C.M.R. 115, 118 (1952).
But see United States v. Herring, 1 C.M.R. 264, 267 (1951) (dictum), which has
apparently not been followed.
36 Morel, 41 B.R. 61, 64 (CM No. 262416, 1944).
[Vol.ll0:684
IMPORTANT SERVICE
duty does not change its character merely because it is carried out in
a different place.
Nevertheless, once a geographical area has been denominated as
important to American defense, the result of the cases concerning ab-
sence in order to avoid transportation changes radically. Thus, in
United States v. Shull,"7 Judge Brosman said: "We are not concerned
here with whether . . . movement to a staging area constitute[s]
important service. . .. Certainly-and this is amply supported by
the military cases-foreign service during time of war or under
emergency conditions and in or near a combat area is important
service . . . . " While the court dismissed the charge because of
the insufficiency of the evidence, it is clear from the language of the
opinion that it believed that the place to which transfer was ordered
and not the duty to be performed there was the proper basis for finding
an evasion of "important service." In United States v. Taylor,3" the
same court accepted the Shull dictum and dismissed without difficulty
the contention that not "all duty in the Far East Command is . . .
important service and that shipment to a port of embarkation for
overseas assignment is too far removed from the combat area to be
considered as encompassed within the phrase," " citing the broad
enumeration of the Manual for Courts-Martial, discussed above.41
Other cases have held that shipment to the Far East Command during
the Korean War42 and even presence at a point of embarkation for
such shipment43 was important service.
These cases ignore reality. Thousands of servicemen spent their
tours in the Far East during the Korean War doing work which was
routine by any standards. Many of them were stationed in Japan and
had a work schedule and duty not dissimilar to those of GI's in the
United States or in foreign countries thousands of miles from the
scene of battle. Even in Korea itself, many troops in noncombat units
never saw battle or engaged in activity proximately related to the
combat troops. Many of the functions performed by men in the
United States more directly aided the actual fighting men than did the
duties of some of the servicemen in the Far East. Foreign soil in a
combat theater has no Midas touch which automatically turns all work
371 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 2 C.M.R. 83 (1952).
38 Id. at 181, 2 C.M.P. at 87.
39 2 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 9 C.M.R. 19 (1953).
40 Id. at 391, 9 C.M.RL at 21. See United States v. Herring, 1 C.M.R. 264, 267
(1951).
41 See text accompanying notes 27-28 smupra.
42 United States v. Vick, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 288, 12 C.M.R. 44 (1953).
43 United States v. Willingham, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 590, 10 C.M.R. 88 (1953).
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into important service. Overseas duty may be important; " a greater
proportion of military personnel in an overseas theater of operations
may be-and probably are-engaging in important service than in
the United States or a foreign country outside the combat zone.45 But
the mere presence of a soldier in such a theater does not in and of
itself promote the success of American arms. Something more must
be shown than simple geographical location before it can be said that
a serviceman is doing tasks vital to the war effort, and unless it can
be shown that his work is in fact important, he cannot be deemed to
be within the intendment of the statute.
The creation of whole areas to which shipment is "important
service" has not been limited to combat zones; similar conclusions have
been drawn concerning broad areas solely because they are deemed
"important" to American defense. In one case, for example, it was
held that all service in Alaska was important-where avoidance of em-
barkation was concerned-because Alaska constituted the northern-
most "anchor" of the Pacific defense perimeter; " a similar case held
service in Europe in 1953 to be important! 47 In neither case was any
effort made to explain in what way the service itself was important;
it was sufficient to the courts that the areas were considered sig-
nificant in defense planning."
But this consideration cannot convert routine duty into something
more. If it is clear that not all duty in a combat area is important, it is
all the clearer when defense perimeters and like areas are considered.
44 United States v. Daniels, 10 C.M.R. 918 (1953).
45 Cf. Donohue, 3 N.A.T.O.-M.T.O. 151, 154 (NATO No. 1566, 1944).
46United States v. Poper, 13 C.M.R. 786 (1953). The court declined to be
influenced by the fact that Alaska was American territory, stressing the importance
of Alaska in support of the United Nations operations in Korea and as an anchor of
the Pacific defense perimeter. Yet it failed to consider at all what duties the accused
was to perform in Alaska. Id. at 788.
47 United States v. Gorringe, 15 C.M.R. 882, 888 (1953).
48 Moreover, once an area is labeled "important," service there remains important
forever after. Thus, in United States v. Emery, 14 C.M.R. 296 (1954), service in
Alaska was held to be important although the board of review, citing United States
v. Boone, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 381, 3 C.M.R. 115 (1952), showed an awareness that not all
overseas service was important. See also United States v. Smith, 17 C.M.R. 406,
407 (1954). The only explanation for the holding in Emery is that Alaska had
previously been held to be important. This sort of reasoning, although not articulated,
also seems to be an explanation for the decisions which continued to find European
service important as recently as 1953. See United States v. Gorringe, supra note 47,
where the board based its finding that European service was important on earlier
cases which in turn had been based on still earlier cases stretching back to 1944.
E.g., United States v. Mathis, 12 C.M.R. 590 (1953); United States v. Priest, 10
C.M.R. 486 (1953). The incongruity of these cases is magnified by the fact that
between 1944 and 1953 both an era of good feeling and a change of "enemies" had
occurred. Could similar reasoning be applied to make Guadalcanal, Gettysburg, and
even Valley Forge sites of important service? Surely there must be a greater con-
nection with the national defense than the fact that at some time in the past the area
was important, although the bones of those who made it so have long since turned
to dust and even the memory of what they did there has faded with time.
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Is American defense jeopardized because a post exchange clerk misses
a shipment to Germany? Is American security endangered by the
fact that an army base in Alaska is short one file clerk? This country's
armed might depends in only a secondary way on potato-peelers, per-
sonnel clerks, and the myriad of other service troops whose activities
are necessary without falling into the special classification of "impor-
ant." And the contributions of such servicemen are the same in
Alaska or Europe as they are in the United States; overseas service
cannot alter their status.49
We have established that, as a matter of logic, transportation
is not in itself "important service." We have similarly shown that it
is impossible to explain the cases which have held transportation to
foreign areas to be "important" by the fact that the service at the
destination, if not the transportation itself, is always "important," since,
except when the destination is the front lines in time of war, it is im-
possible to say that service within any area is always "important." It
is a tribute to the mesmerizing language of the Manual for Courts-
Martial that the military courts have had less trouble recognizing that
service in a combat zone may not be important than that transporta-
tion to foreign service may be a routine activity leading to still other
routine assignments.
C. Transportation Leading to Important Service
It is still necessary to examine the application of the short deser-
tion statute to the avoidance of transportation, embarkation, and over-
seas duty when the final duty to be performed upon the completion of
transportation, if not the act of being transported itself, is properly de-
fined as "important service." Two factors are important in this dis-
cussion: the degree to which transportation can ever be considered
important service and the degree to which Congress intended to include
any avoidance of transportation within the scope of the short desertion
statute.
It may be argued with some plausibility that receiving trans-
portation can never be described as performing a service, important or
unimportant. A serviceman must be transported, as he must eat, if he
is to perform those services which are his primary duty. Yet trans-
4 9 Lest the reader be confused by this stress on what is rational, it must be
repeated that avoidance of embarkation for foreign service has been held to fall within
the short desertion statute even when absence from the same service, once trans-
portation is completed, clearly would not. Conpare United States v. Flowers, 1
A.F.C.M.R. 603 (1949) (permanent KP avoiding foreign transfer is under statute),
with Murtha, 28 E.T.O. 259, 264 (ETO No. 14905, 1945) (avoiding combat unit KP
in Germany is outside statute). It is hard to find a rationale for a statute which is
thus made to declare that a soldier who avoids a duty by absence before shipment is
a deserter but one who waits until after shipment is not.
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portation, like food, is a service provided for him to increase his value
as a fighting man. On the other hand, should a serviceman refuse
transportation into actual combat, it may be presumed that his true
intention is to avoid a combat mission which is quite properly de-
scribed as "important service." This seems to be the clue to the
proper interpretation of the place of "embarkation for foreign duty"
language in the Manual.
The legislative history supports this interpretation.5" Far from
suggesting that it was the intention of Congress to penalize servicemen
adverse to ocean voyages or duty far from home, it seems clearly to
indicate that the concern of Generals Crowder and Ansell and of Con-
gress itself was with soldiers who would not fight or closely support
fighting units in France and who found that evasion of embarkation
was the most effective means to that end.5' This is consistent with the
tentative "may" of the Manual; it suggests that the avoidance of "im-
portant service" need not take place at the very moment when the
service is to begin but may take place as far in advance of the service
as the time of embarkation and still be sufficiently closely related to the
duty at the end of transportation to fall within the purview of the
short desertion statute. Similarly, the Manual's exclusion of such
services as "drill, target practice, maneuvers, and practice marches" 52
is a judgment that these activities are normally not so closely related to
the eventual "important service" as to fall within the statute.
Thus explained, the "overseas embarkation" language of the
Manual fits into a rational scheme of the short desertion statute. But
the military courts have so consistently misapplied this language as to
make it doubtful that we can ever hope to see it limited to those cases
in which avoidance of embarkation is in fact avoidance of the impor-
tant service which would follow the transportation. In view of the
inconsistency and rank absurdity spawned by this rule, its early demise
would be a boon to military law.
III. To A PROPER DEFINITION OF "IMPORTANT SERVICE"
It is possible to summarize some of the contentions made in this
Comment in order to form a sounder definition of "important service."
In so doing, it is important to remember that the term cannot simply
be equated with the hazards of the task 5 nor compressed into neat
50 See Hearings on S. 64 [A Bill to Establish Military Justice] Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 416,
1158-59, 1162 (1919).
5'id. at 1158-59, 1162.
52 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, 164(a) (2), Exec.
Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303, 1391 (1951).
53 See note 10 supra.
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compartments by labeling certain forms of activity, such as embarka-
tion, overseas duty, or service in a combat zone, "important" without
regard to their actual contribution to military success. We must re-
member that "important service" requires a limited and rational
application consistent with its position as defining a capital crime.
As has been suggested, the proper place to begin is with an
orientation toward a concept revolving around the duties for which
an armed force is primarily maintained. Preeminent among the func-
tions of any military force is the defense against and neutralization
and destruction of enemy military power. Accordingly, combat with
enemy forces, which is necessary to that end, must always be impor-
tant service within the meaning of the statute. For the same reason,
activity proximately in support of combat units, on which they im-
mediately depend for their effectiveness in actual operations, should
likewise be deemed important service. In addition to combat duty as
such, other duties immediately connected with and in support of
national defense must be considered to be important service in military
law. Thus the duty of guarding our coasts during a time of threatened
invasion 5 or of patrolling strategic waters to prevent the infiltration
of hostile shipping during time of war r5 are properly considered to be
important service. Similarly, providing transportation which is proxi-
mately related to the performance of these vital duties must fall within
the purview of the statute.
On the other hand, the performance of routine duties, such as
kitchen police, maintaining files, or attending to the host of adminis-
trative details common to all large organizations should never be
considered important service. Nor should training,"0 even training for
combat,5 7 be included within the concept. Similarly, transportation to
these duties cannot properly be described as "important service." Pun-
ishment for quitting these duties can safely be left to other, noncapital
articles of the Code.5s
In the light of the cases, it seems clear that the proper rationale
for "important service" is grounded in the need to penalize most
strongly those servicemen who actually jeopardize military success by
54 Calvin, 13 B.RL 113 (CM No. 220947, 1942); Frank, 13 B.R. 109 (CM No.
220946, 1942).
55United States v. Wimp, 4 C.M.R. 509 (1952).
56 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
51 Conon, 14 B.R. 191 (CM No. 224805, 1942). But cf. United States v. Deller,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 412-13, 12 C.M.R. 165, 168-69 (1953), in which the court announced
a dubious exception that where the training is a statutory prerequisite for important
service, the training itself becomes important.
58 See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 86 (absence without leave),
87 (missing movement), 92 (failure to obey order or regulation), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886,
887, 892 (1958).
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their unauthorized absence--to keep them at their tasks by means of
a special deterrent when their absence constitutes an attempt to evade
duty which is intimately related to the success of the military arms.
There is no foolproof test for what duty is of immediate importance to
military success. It is clear that no arbitrary standard will serve.
To label any particular duty "important," one must determine
that, from a view of the overall military situation, the duty to be per-
formed by the absentee would be such as to aid the success of the
military power proximately and immediately. Of course, since the
absentee never entered upon the performance of his duties, it cannot
be known whether his particular performance would have made a
significant contribution. Thus, for example, we cannot know whether
an infantry soldier on the front line who had absented himself would
have been in a position to kill or capture enemy soldiers, or whether
he would have done his duty had he been present. We can, however,
discover the importance of the activities he was to perform and thus
determine with sufficient exactitude for military law whether his service
was "important" within the contemplation of that law.
